INTRODUCTION
Legal inquiries into the future of law in an era of globalisation are regularly confronted with accounts of law's alleged weakness to extend itself effectively beyond national, jurisdictional boundaries. At the same time, lawyers are not the only scholars by far who reflect on the regulatory challenges of today, which are often summarised under the heading of "global governance". An investigation into the nature and scope of legal regulation in this context is unavoidably exposed to questions of origin and function, on the one hand, and to questions of relations, compatibility and inter-disciplinarity, on the other. In this often polemic and heated discourse of disciplines and narratives, an effort to re-construct a discipline's approach and methodology offers insights into both the trajectories and the characteristics of a particular discipline's "take" on the problems which are at stake in a fast evolving highly asymmetric global arena.
With these considerations in mind, the paper takes the concerns among international lawyers about "legal fragmentation" seriously 1 if only to contrast and to compare these with the evolution of legal orders at state level. Such mirroring offers a respite in what has otherwise too quickly been offered as a swansong about the fading light and impact of law under the duress of * Professor of Law and Canada Research Chair, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto. Email: PZumbansen@osgoode.yorku.ca. This chapter builds on Zumbansen, "Transnational Legal Pluralism", (2010) 1 Transnational Legal Theory, pp 141-189, and has grown out of the research project on "Extra-territoriality" between the Law Schools of Tulane University in New Orleans and Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University in Frankfurt, Germany. This project also serves as one of the foundations for international research collaboration between scholars from Canada and the United States on Transnational Governance and Norm Production. Financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Grant # 864-2007-0265 ) is gratefully acknowledged. 1 constitutionalism" and the alleged or complementary "constitutionalisation" of international law. 3 Running through the majority of analyses offered in this context is the contention that the absence of a "world government" radicalises the governance dilemma facing modern societies, and, in turn, invites reflections upon the way in which the improvement of participatory elements can strengthen the democratic foundations of global governance institutions on the one hand, 4 while the gradual acceptance of core human-rights values may eventually foster the emergence of a global set of values, on the other. 5 Such contentions, however, occur in surprising isolation 2 For a rejection of the idea that law is a victim to globalisation, see, from the perspective of law, A. C. Aman Jr., 'The Limits of Globalization and the Future of Administrative Law: From Government to Governance', (2001) 8 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 379-400, and, from sociology, S. Sassen, Globalization and Its Discontents. Essays on the New Mobility of People and Money (The New Press, 1998) . 3 See, for example, C. Walter, 'Constitutionalizing (Inter)national Governance -Possibilities and Limits to the Development of an Inernational Constitutional Law', (2001) 44 German Yearbook of International Law 170-201, A. Peters, 'The Merits of Global Constitutionalism', (2009) Law', (2005) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 15. 5 For a very insightful exploration of the challenges, see M. Kumm, 'The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between Constitutionalism in and beyond the State', in J. L. Dunoff and J. P. Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World?`Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (Cambridge University Press, 2009 ), 258-324. From a different angle and with great scepticism: U. Baxi, The Death of Human Rights, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, 2005) . from both legal theory and governance discourses, which have long been pursued within the framework of the nation state. The separate tracks of inquiry in this case, one focusing on the future of law and law's fragmentation in an era of globalisation, and the other concerned with the transformation of law in the context of radically-transformed statehood, 6 prevent us from taking a closer look at the ways in which law has been changing over time. Certainly, scholars in law, political science or sociology have long been interested in the connections between the evolution of state institutions and the development of a global political economy. 7 But, such inquiries which focus on the entanglements between political and legal institutions, on the one hand, and on the myriad forms of "state-market" relations from a political economy perspective, 8 on the other, are too rarely included in the current contentions of global "legal fragmentation". As a result, the challenges of global governance are addressed with too little connection to ongoing attempts to trace their origins in, or connections with, previous "governance" discourses through which modern societies have long been described. In the present paper, I am suggesting to coin the perspective between "national" and "global" governance challenges as transnational, in order to offer a bridge between these separately pursued research agendas. Going beyond the early work in international legal theory, 9 and partly drawing on the insights from "transnational" commercial law, 10 we can begin to understand "transnational law", above all, as a 6 A case in point is the transformation of the "welfare state" -see, for example, P. Pierson, 'The New Politics of the Welfare State', (1996) 48 World Politics 143-179. methodological approach, and less as a distinctly demarcated legal "field", such as, say, contract law, or administrative law. Transnational law, from the perspective taken here, 11 emerges foremost as a methodological lens through which we can study the particular transformation of legal institutions in the context of an evolving complex society. As we relativise contentions of society being the "other" side of the "state", 12 which are running deep within the continental legal imagination, we begin to recognise the necessity of "defining" society as such, rather than merely assuming it as a given background, against which we may freely theorise about the "future of law". 13 Emphasizing both the co-existence and the competition between hard and soft, official and unofficial, public and private norms, this paper suggests to draw on concepts of legal pluralism in the attempt to address the challenges presented by transnational governance regimes for law and legal theory. The here proposed concept of "transnational legal pluralism" suggests that law be studied from a methodological angle in the context of the evolving theoretisations of societal ordering, rather than as a contained discipline. Central to this undertaking is a shift in perspective, which leads to a focus on actors, norms and processes as the building blocks of a methodology of transnational law. 14 This approach suggests a relativisation of a number of assumptions commonly associated with law. One is its territorial connection with a politically institutionalised system of rule creation, implementation and adjudication, which, in Europe, has, for a relatively long time, been framed as the state-law nexus. From a transnational perspective, this nexus becomes 129-153, R. Goode, 'Usage and Its Reception in Transnational Commercial Law', (1997) 46 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1-36, R. Cranston, 'Theorizing Transnational Commercial Law', (2007) 42 Texas For a more extensive discussion, see ; cf. P. Zumbansen, 'Transnational Law', in J. Smits (ed) Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Edward Elgar, 2006) , 738-754and idemP. Zumbansen, 'Neither `Public' nor `Private', `National' nor `International': Transnational Corporate Governance from a Legal Pluralist Perspective', (2011) 38 Journal of For a powerful discussion of this assumption, see J. Habermas, The Postnational Constellation (MIT Press, 2001) . 13 This is forcefully argued by T. Vesting, Rechtstheorie (C.H. Beck, 2007) . 14 For an application of this approach for a law school course, see Alfred C Aman Jr & Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law: Actors, Norms, Processes, (Charlottesville VA, Lexis-Nexis, 2012, forthcoming) . questionable, as, not only around the world, but also in Europe itself, the legal sociological lens reveals an impressive array of non-state originating norms that have long been binding human and organisational behaviour. 15 This observation has prompted sociologists to perceive of law primarily from a functional perspective, emphasising its particular operation in the context of a differentiated modern society. 16 From the vantage point of this theory, society is no longer validly represented as a sphere defined primarily in contrast from the state; instead, in a society "without peak or centre" (Luhmann), law is but one of several societal forms of communication, which unfolds according to its own rationality and by use of its own particular vocabulary ("code").
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Even if one does not go so far as to represent law as nothing but a particular form of societal communication, the contention of a specific nexus between law and a (theory of) society in which law emerges and operates, promises to render insights into the evolving forms of law, which appear to offer more adequate depictions of law than the ambivalent attempts to reconcile the assumption of a strong state-law nexus with the proliferation of numerous, non-state based rule generating processes and institutions.
Beyond the relativisation and problematization of the law/non-law distinction, which is inherent to the legal sociological/legal pluralist approach to legal regulation, there is the other significant challenge arising out of the law-society approach taken here, namely, the already mentioned relativisation of a territorial grounding of law in a particular jurisdiction. As we study law in its societal context, the confines of society can no longer adequately be drawn with 15 H. W. Arthurs, Without the Law: Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth Century England (University of Toronto Press, 1988); Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law, note Error! Bookmark not defined. above; for an insightful resumé, see M. Galanter, 'Farther Along', (1999) 33 Law & Society Review 1113-1123, and M. Galanter, ' In the Winter of our Discontent: Law, Anti-Law, and Social Science', (2006) Annual Review of N. Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law (Routledge Kegan & Paul, 1985) ; idemN. Luhmann, 'Law as a Social System', (1989) 83 Northwestern University Law Review 136-150;  idemN. Luhmann, 'Operational closure and structural coupling: the differentiation of the legal system', (1992 ) 13 Cardozo Law Review 1419 -1441 N. Luhmann, Political Theory in the Welfare State [1981, transl. by John Bednarz Jr.] (Walter de Gruyter, 1990 ). reference to specific states, nations or regions. Instead, society must be perceived as world society. 18 Within world society, the study of law (and of regulatory governance more generally) refers to "territory", "jurisdiction" or the "state" in order to appreciate specific, historicallygrown or politically-constituted frameworks of legal evolution at a particular given time and in a particular space -no more and no less. The "no less" deserves particular emphasis in the context of frequently made assertions of an allegedly de-territorialised 19 or "autonomous" legal order. 20 From the methodological perspective suggested here, such assertions are of lesser interest with regard to their explanatory value as to their motives. In order to unpack the claims of an increasingly de-territorialised or, autonomous nature of regulatory governance, it is necessary, on the one hand, to re-visit the arguments which were launched by some scholars who connected the claim of an "exhaustion" of law and of the nation-state's regulatory power with an emphasis on "social norms". 21 On the other hand, we need to study the arguments of scholars who describe transnational law as grounded in what they refer to as "global" legal pluralism. 22 As we will see in the following, both groups of scholars put a particular emphasis on the limits of traditional legal regulation, and question the adequacy of the state-law nexus to capture the dynamics of regulatory governance today. But, a closer look at the arguments appears to reveal that the shared interest in a legal pluralist description of governance originates from different political standpoints. With regard to the scholars who argue that the state is increasingly reaching its 18 N. Luhmann, 'The World Society as a Social System', (1982) regulatory capacity, such arguments mainly seem to be driven by a rejection of so-called "interventionist" state policy, reminiscent as such from the discussions around the US Supreme Court's Lochner jurisprudence. 23 In contrast, scholars in legal sociology and legal theory with a strong interest in questions of "access to justice" and the problem of the legal system's closedness to wide sections of society mobilised a limits-of-law critique from an opposed political perspective. 24 This "availability" of legal pluralist thinking to different, even juxtaposed, political projects 25 forms a crucial background to today's assertions of the nature and aspiration of law in a global context, given the evolving forms of regulatory institutions. 26 Upon this basis, it becomes possible to read the currently dominant narrative of the autonomisation of law or of an "end of (state-based) law" in an era of globalisation in a different light. Rather than describing the advent of globalisation as an end-point of legal development, from a transnational perspective, it becomes necessary to de-construct the various law-state associations in order to gain a more adequate understanding of the evolution of law in relation and response to the development of what must be described as "world society". The currently lamented lack of democratic accountability, say, in international economic governance, 27 can 23 Lochner v New York (198 US 45) -1905) ; for an insightful history of the case's reception and legacy, see S. Choudhry, 'The Lochner Era and Comparative Constitutionalism', (2002) University of Toronto Faculty of Law, then be perceived as a further development in a highly-differentiated and de-territorialised society. The paper thus rejects the attempts by lawyers to re-align transnational governance actors with traditional concepts of the state or of civil society, and, instead, contrasts them with various advances in sociology and anthropology with regard to the evolution of "social norms" and "spaces" of governance and regulation. These perspectives, on the one hand, effectively challenge the present attempts to conceptualise a hierarchically-structured global legal order, while they question the association of legal-rule creation with a territorially-fixed place, on the other. As such, the concept of "transnational legal pluralism" (TLP) proposed here goes beyond Philip Jessup's 1956 idea of "transnational law", through which he sought to complement and challenge Public and Private International Law. TLP brings together insights from legal sociology and legal theory with research on global justice, ethics and regulatory governance in order to illustrate the transnational nature of law and regulation, which always push against the various claims to legal unity and hierarchy made over time.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: the next section (II) re-visits the legal pluralist insights into the tension between law and non-law. Against this background, the paper will trace the emergence of border-crossing regulatory regimes as a challenge to state-oriented legal reasoning (III). It illustrates the parallels between the impasses of legal theorising about "global" or "transnational" governance with those that marked the evolution of law in the nation state. Section IV re-visits the frequently asked question of whether globalisation marks the end of law: attempting a negative answer ("law is dead -long live law!"), this section proposes to read the emergence of "transnational law" not as the advent of a "new" field -similar to the way in which, say, environmental law or Internet law were considered to be "new" only relatively recently. Instead, the central assumption is that transnational law constitutes a methodological shift in legal theory -an attempt to bridge the experience of legal pluralism in the nation state with that of the emerging transnational space. Section V pursues this argument and applies it to the initial paradox between law and non-law. Transnational law can now be understood as a lens through which to perceive the argumentative parallels between the impasses, roadblocks and "impossibilities" of law that recur both "inside" and "outside" of the nation state. As the borders of the state are re-constructed as historically-contingent reference-points for the evolution of legal reasoning, transnational law becomes the legal theoretical re-construction of law/non-law in the world society. The concluding section (VI) sets out the framework of transnational legal pluralism.
II. THE ANXIETIES OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE AMBIVALENT NATURE OF LAW
Today, many regulatory areas can be understood as instantiations of transnational norm-creation.
Supply chains that tie regional and global markets together, Similarly, fields such as company insolvency and even labour law, which had long been understood as embedded in historically-evolved political and regulatory economies, 35 today display a distinctly transnational character. 36 Constituted through a complex overlapping of different national, international, public and private norm-creation processes, these fields underscore the conundrical nature of the proliferating global regulatory space: in response, statebased categorisations of normative hierarchy, the separation of powers and the unity of law 37 fall short of grasping the nature of the evolving transnational normative order. It is easy to recognise a certain sense of urgency 39 in the current search for appropriate labels, concepts and instruments for this regulatory space, for which lawyers have long been forming alliances with scholars in a wide range of social sciences including sociologists, political scientists, economists and geographers. Such inter-disciplinary collaboration both in practice and in methodology is anything but new to law and legal theory; building on early beginnings made by social scientists who emphasised the importance of social facts and increasingly incorporated empirical findings, 40 the study of law has, for a long time, been carried out in close proximity to, and in the constant shadow of, social studies. 41 The already alluded to legal sociological projects at the end of the Nineteenth and the beginning of the Twentieth century can today be seen as the eminent precursors of an evermore intensifying study into the institutional foundations of legal systems in a constellation marked by the erosion of boundaries between domestic legal orders and the continuing contestation of the normative-conceptual foundations of the Rule of Law, the welfare state and its ambiguous aftermath. 46 and from the right -as well as the critique of juridification 48 have today given way to a cacophonic contestation of the merits and limits of "law's knowledge", its evolving nature and its role. 49 Seen in this light, the search for the "nature of law" has always been carried out with the pretentious assumption that it is or must be different, that law is -or, in the end can bedifferent from religion, morality, and economics. But the short Twentieth century has left the emerging body of law battered and torn, scarred and violated. 50 In turn, our attempts at resurrecting it risk being either naïve or incredulously courageous, as the definition of law has become elusive. Should law be understood as a means of oppression, of corruption and domination, or as a promise of hope, as an instrument of liberation and emancipation? Can we recognise and understand law only in its embeddedness in a particular institutional setting, or do we see law by its function in society? 51 Its multi-faceted and, as such, fragile constitution has been associated with its paradoxical foundation 52 and its impossible creation out of an act of violence. 53 Roger Cotterrell remarked, in this context, that the difficulty of answering these questions has to be seen against the background of a blurring of the boundaries between "law" and "society". 54 "Law", he writes, "constitutes society in so far as it is, itself, an aspect of society, a framework and an expression of understandings that enable society to exist. A sociological perspective on legal ideas is necessary to recognise and analyse the intellectual and moral power of law in this respect". 55 Understanding law, then, as a "social phenomenon", 56 the distinction between law and society does indeed blur: the internal/external distinction is "replaced by a conception of partial, relatively narrow or specialised participant perspectives on (and in) law, confronting and being confronted by, penetrating, illuminating, and being penetrated and illuminated by, broader, more inclusive perspectives on (and in) law as a social phenomenon". at 176. 55 Ibid., p 182. 56 Ibid., p 187: "Sociological interpretation of legal ideas is not a particular, specialized way of approaching law, merely co-existing with other kinds of understanding. Sociology of law in this particular context is a transdisciplinary enterprise and aspiration to broaden understanding of law as a social phenomenon." 57 Ibid., p 188. in this particular context is a transdisciplinary enterprise and aspiration to broaden understanding of law as a social phenomenon." Such a perspective on law must be understood as an attempt to respond to law's own alleged lack of methodology: "Law does not have a 'methodology of its own' and borrows methodologies from any discipline that can supply them." Teubner, 'Juridification -Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions', in G. Teubner (ed) Juridification of Social Spheres (Walter de Gruyter, 1987), 3-48. point that law must be re-thought and re-asserted as social science, as one among other conceptual approaches to the study of modern societies. 77 In the absence of world government, attempts to demarcate a legal system which is adequate to the "post-national constellation" 78 display, above all, a deep-running anxiety in the face of a perceived lack of unity, coherence and institutional and normative hierarchy. 79 The procedural and substantive architectures of fast-emerging transnational regulatory regimes 80 raise questions which go to the heart of any legal theory and which we have accepted to address mainly through the lens of the state. 81 These questions arise around the "politics of private lawmaking", 82 and, as such, primarily concern the constitutional dimensions of private ordering, to 77 G. Teubner, 'Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law', (1983) wit, issues of accountability, legitimacy and democratic control. 83 What makes these accountability and legitimacy issues, which have, in part, been driving the important work in "global administrative law", 84 particularly intriguing is that they underscore the degree to which the evolving transnational regulatory regimes are impressive illustrations of the constitutionalisation challenges that the global legal order faces today. 85 As increasingly specialised, functionally-differentiated problem areas and spheres of human and institutional conduct evolve in response to a combination of external impulses and their own particular logic, 86 the law governing these constellations becomes deeply entwined in these complex, 83 layered constitutions. 87 Where does this definition of law leave us? Clearly, law's selfdestruction began before globalisation. 88 Globalisation, differently understood, would provide for a label depicting another stage of reflection on the relationship between law and its other. The predominance of law's institutionalisation in the state during the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries casts a long shadow over our present attempts to imagine law. The challenge of law after, in the shadow of the Twentieth century welfare state, is its functional diffusion and normative evaporation. To be sure, this temporalisation ("after") indicates a shift of paradigm, a conclusion and abdication of a dominant concept, rather than a historical development of a series of institutional frameworks that comprehensively replaces the preceding models of the state and modes of legal thinking. 89 When referring to "global governance", scholars often associate a dramatic disembedding of law and its institutional architecture. 90 But, the -relative -loss of a reliable and comprehensive legal infrastructure is accompanied by an increasingly intensifying debate around an evolving global legal-consciousness, in particular with regard to human rights. 91 Global governance is, as such, understood to have further opened the windows to a world "out there" of injustice, unequal 87 G. Teubner/P. Korth, 'Two Kinds of Legal Pluralism: Collision of Laws in the Double Fragmentation of World Society', in M. Young (ed) Regime Interaction in International Law: Theoretical and Practical Challenges 2009), forthcoming, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1416041 Ms. p 5, (available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1416041): "Unitary global law reproduces itself through legal acts which are guided by different programs but are in the end oriented towards the binary code legal/illegal. The unity of global law is just not, as in the nation state, based on the consistency of legal norms structurally secured by the hierarchy of the courts: rather, it is process-based, deriving simply from the modes of connection between legal operations, which transfer binding legality between even highly heterogeneous legal orders." 88 But see W. Twining, Globalisation and Legal Theory (Northwestern University Press, 2000), note 37 above. 89 For a parallel application of such a perspective, see D. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Classical Legal Thought (1975) (Beard Books, 2006 ), note 43 above. distribution and grave rights abuses, 92 a claim, however, fiercely contested from scholars and practitioners "on the ground". 93 As illustrated, for example, in the continued interest in the "constitutionalisation" of international law, 94 the question of whether there is any pervasive role for law in a globalised world remains at the core of the present engagement with global governance issues. As suggested above, the complexity which is inherent to the differentiation of law and non-law in regulatory governance, and for which the evolution of modern states gives ample illustration, is further exacerbated in the global context. This means that a crisis, or the "exhaustion" of law, cannot be depicted as a consequence of globalisation, but as an inherent feature of law's evolution in its relation to society. To re-iterate the central thesis of this paper: the alleged crisis of law and legal regulation, whether it be depicted as a loss of state sovereignty or as a problem of a lack of (democratic, political) accountability 95 and legitimacy 96 in the global context, has to be understood as a particular amplification of a problem with law that has been a long time coming. In this regard, it can be shown that many of our present concerns about the fate of law in relation to a continuing transformation of the state and the herewith connected 92 U. Baxi, The Death of Human Rights, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, 2005) note 5 above. 93 challenges to "models of democracy" and issues of legitimacy and accountability 97 must be assessed against the background of a re-construction of legal evolution in the national, local context. Without suggesting that the legitimacy and regulatory challenges connected with the "amorphous" concept of global governance 98 are exact mirror reflections of locally-experienced moments of exhaustion, 99 there is a particular role to be played by local, domestic regulatory experiences for the conceptualisation of global governance regimes. The role of law occupies a particularly challenging place in this inquiry, in particular because the rise of globalisation is so often associated, if not with the demise of law, 100 then with an immense pressure on law and legal institutions. In contrast, what is argued here is that globalisation processes can be understood as an invitation to reflect on the connections between our attempts to make sense of a fragmented global, transnational normative order and our particular, yet anything but homogenous, experiences with law and regulation at national level. In short, then, the paper contends that globalisation does not pose the first advent of a "crisis of law", understood as a tool of regulation. Instead, the varied history of law reveals the intricate combination of hubris and fragility, violence and vulnerability, that underlies the idea and experience of law.
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III. METHODOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES
A study of law in the context of the evolving global governance debates, then, prompts parallel efforts of introspection (say, regarding the definition and the function of law) and of demarcation (for example, regarding the different qualities between legal, political and economic governance). Such efforts, however, are being pursued against the background of a still tentative description of the transnational regulatory landscape. While, for example, from the perspective of comparative law, there is much to learn from studying law against the background of a particular, national, historical context, 104 See the succinct observations by W. Twining, Globalisation and Legal Theory (Northwestern University Press, 2000), note 37 above, with regard to the challenges to jurisprudence and by J. Osterhammel/N. P. Petersson, Globalization: A Short History (Princeton University Press, 2004) , with regard to the interdisciplinary challenges of studying and deciphering "globalisation". "The fact that historians assert with calm detachment that this phenomenon has existed for a long time does not preclude the need to make a political assessment of its impact on the present." Ibid., p 150. challenge to re-assert the place and role of law. Re-conceiving of law as transnational suggests that domestic experiences with law are crucial reference points. Yet, they cannot serve as reference points of institutional or normative design, which we could simply employ and transpose into the transnational arena. Instead, this approach must point towards two investigative strands. One is that the inquiry into the evolution and, eventually, the so-called "crisis" of law as regulation of social activity has to attempt the re-construction as an ironic project that is concerned with the meaning and aspiration of law -over time and space. 107 This constellation can be grasped as the relation or tension between law and non-law, between legality and legitimacy, between law and justice, society, or other.
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The re-construction of local (for example, national) experiences with law as constantly challenged by its opposite or its foundations, embeddedness or contestations forms only one strand of the following inquiry. 109 The second investigative strand is to return to the original starting-point of our reflections of how globalisation can be said to challenge law. In this dimension, we are concerned with the task of adequately incorporating or, perhaps even acknowledging, the gap between the particular context in which norms and the normative environments have evolved locally, on the one hand, and the emerging, allegedly unruly spaces of normative order on the global level, on the other.
Against this background, the methodological dimension of transnational law re-asserts itself.
Approaching transnational law from a methodological perspective should help us to refrain from too quickly depicting the "transnational" as a distinct regulatory space, which would differ from the national and the international due to its de-territorial scope and its hybrid, public-private constitution. Instead, transnational law emerges as a particular perspective on law as part of a 107 Hereto, in more detail: Zumbansen, "Law after the Welfare State: Formalism, Functionalism and the Ironic Turn of Reflexive Law", note 25 above. 108 See, for example, D. Trubek, 'Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study of Law and Development', (1972) society that itself cannot sufficiently be captured by reference to national or de-nationalised boundaries. The transnational dimension does not arise with regard to territorial, or jurisdictional, confines, but from a re-construction of the form and function of law deep within highly-specialised areas of societal activity.
While this uncoupling of social systems from a state-associated framework of political, economic and legal order certainly presents a dramatic challenge to state-based theories of law its real gist lies in fact elsewhere. The uneasy relationship between "society" and "world society", between the national and the global, should not be seen as a threat but as an element which is inherent to the constitution of legal spaces. From this perspective, transnational refers to the "other" of the law, which challenges, but simultaneously recognises, its locally-learned relations to concrete structures of embeddedness, to particular experiences of historical evolution and contextual differentiation. 
IV. THINGS THAT WE LOST -THINGS THAT WE OUGHT TO REMEMBER
Such a look back at "places" reveals intriguing parallels between current global governance concerns and older debates around the effectiveness of legal regulation in complex societies. 115 Clearly, the hybridity of regulatory instruments, which many global governance scholars observe today, was a well-known feature of legal regulation as studied by legal sociologists and legal pluralists decades ago. In that regard, Sally Falk Moore's analysis of law as being constituted in part by social norms, routines, customs and practices, and, at the same time, by hard legal regulation, proved of vital importance in opening our eyes to the intricate relations between the regulator and concrete, local, intimate social spaces. in the wake of the 2009 financial crisis, but also law's role in global governance more generally.
In the context of the late 1970s and early 1980s, which saw a far-reaching crumbling of socialdemocratic policy and a growing scepticism with Keynesian economics, a fairly ambitious theoretical proposal was made that aimed at the re-situating of law into a more accentuated model of society: in this model, which did not lend itself to a straightforward ideological appropriation, society is composed of intersecting, but separated, communications, which are each constituted by a distinct terminology ("code"). Law was to be understood as one of these social systems -along with "economy", "politics", "religion", or "art". 123 Upon the basis of this position, the concept of "reflexive law" was proposed as a form of law marked, above all, by a crucial exposure to, and immersion into, its surrounding systems, while it remained "operationally" closed. Due to its "cognitive" openness, however, law must constantly receive impulses, "irritations", and, relying on its autopoietic nature, formulate legal responses, i.e., continue its systematic operation. In the face of the weakening welfare state and the growing frustration with ineffective, undemocratic, and over-generalising and paternalising regulatory laws, the concept of reflexive law was offered to explain the particular challenge and form of legal regulation in a complex world. Its -not uncontested -core consisted of understanding law as being taken out of a learned institutional context made up of official institutions authoritatively creating state-originating laws and, instead, being forced to re-assert itself in highly-diversified complex environments. This radicalisation of law's functional orientation constitutes a new stage in the assessment of law's institutional form, as it has been learned over time. Whereas law is still today most often associated with the state, already the legal sociological work at the turn of the century as well as the legal pluralist work since the 1960s and 1970s had long questioned this tight coupling of law with the state.
Yet, the exuberant turn away from the state and to the market at the end of the Twentieth century can be seen as smartly employing the very methodological orientations that had 123 N. Luhmann, Rechtssoziologie (1980 ), 3. Aufl. (Westdeutscher Verlag, 1987 ; N. Luhmann, 'Law as a Social System', (1989) 83 Northwestern University Law Review 136-150; N. Luhmann, Law as a Social System (K Ziegert transl., F Kastner, D Schiff, R Nobles, R Ziegert eds.) Their hope had been thereby to save the political ambitions of the welfare state, while continuing the socio-political debate over the substance and direction of political intervention. In contrast, today's neo-formalism and neo-functionalism threatens to cut the ties between current quest to respond to the challenges of globalisation and the previous struggles over law and politics. Its proponents characterise legal regulation as inappropriately policy-driven and as undue infringement of the societal actors' capacity to regulate their own affairs autonomously. 125 Following a self-confident period of law's embeddedness in a comprehensive welfare state, legal policy in recent years has been marked by a much more accentuated spirit of precariousness, which expresses itself in a heavy reliance on arguments of "necessity", of "objectivity" and "naturalness". This development has prepared the ground for a functionalist interpretation and application of legal norms in politically-charged contexts which were experiencing fundamental shifts from public to private regulation, often informed by economic reasoning. The attack on contract adjudication and governmental "intervention" that accompanied these developments regularly depicted a market as originally existing without politics, without government regulation. 126 This depiction of the market and the state as separate 124 worlds created troubling alliances with policy recommendations which promoted the privatisation of public services, and which were often fuelled by arguments of efficiency and cost reduction. 127 Yet, whether or not, and, if so, in which forms, private actors assume formerly public regulatory-functions represents the outcome of both the political choices and of other socio-economic developments which are unfolding at both the national and the transnational level. 128 The allegedly available "fresh start" for societal self-regulation without state interference -at least as it was widely perceived until the autumn of 2008 -stood in stark contrast to the observation already made decades ago -that when market actors are enabled and empowered to exercise their private autonomy, they are exercising this freedom based upon public deliberation and consensus. 129 While there is considerable reason to believe, today, that we have entered a stage in the assessment of the state and the market in which we carefully have to turn our attention again to the long and winding history of this relationship, 130 the identification of starting-points for a reconstructive project is far from clear. 131 As the treacherous de-nationalisation 132 of regulatory areas continues to pose tremendous conceptual problems for state-based theories of law, we must aim at combining our methodological inquiry into the nature of transnational law with a bold re-127 For a critique, see A. C. Aman Jr., 'The Limits of Globalization and the Future of Administrative Law: From Government to Governance', (2001) 8 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 379-400. 128 This led Philip Jessup to his capturing three dramas about constellations within and beyond the nation state that involve parallel questions of democracy and participation. See Jessup, Transnational Law, note 9 above. construction of the critical perspectives from which to discuss the need for "better", "more efficient", "tougher", etc., regulation, as is demanded today in the face of what continues to unfold as a dramatic financial and economic crisis.
V. THE EVOLVING NATURE OF TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE REGIMES
The ambivalent politics of this shift between "national" and "transnational" perspectives is today constituted by a combination of local and transnational actors and norms, connected through "networks" and "migrating" standards. 136 The contested political dimensions as well as the high degree of the technicality of the regulatory subjects of transnational regulatory areas 137 present a formidable challenge to traditional, regulatory theories of law. 138 As alluded to above, it is this intricate combination of political ambivalence and technical specialisation of transnational regulation, which prompts a renewed reflection on the relation between regulatory law and differentiated areas of societal activity. Legal sociology and legal pluralism, in particular, have long been developing tools to scrutinise the tension between "official" and "unofficial" norm creation, between "hard" and "soft" law, between what -at least in the West -has often been depicted as a juxtaposition of state law-making, on the one hand, and "private ordering" or "social norms", on the other. This constellation prompted legal sociologists "to investigate the correlations between law and other spheres of culture". 139 Re-visiting the legal pluralist work in the second half of the Twentieth provides a rich background for contemporary assessments of "hybrid legal spaces" 145 that cannot be sufficiently captured through references to local or national contexts. A distinctly transnational legal pluralist lens allows us to study such regimes not as entirely detached from national political and legal orders, but as emerging out of and reaching beyond them. The transnational dimension of hybrid regulatory actors and the newly emerging forms of norms radicalises their "semi-autonomous" nature (Moore), and we begin to conceive of regulatory spaces as being marked by a dynamic tension between formal and informal norm-making processes.
But, what about the politics of transnational regulation? 146 Again, an example taken from the corporate law context may serve as an illustration: the much lamented, regulatory "failure" of traditional, state-based legal-political intervention into multi-national corporations (MNC) 147 has 141 M. Galanter, 'Justice in many rooms: Courts, Private Ordering and Indigenous Law', (1981) 19 Journal of Legal Pluralism 1-47. 142 long been serving as an argument for the need to develop either distinctly "post-national", institutionalised governance forms or to strengthen further the grip of self-regulatory and soft instruments, which have only a voluntary binding nature. 148 Mirroring the complex, hard-tonavigate landscape of border-crossing corporate activity, the proposed conceptual approaches vary greatly. Instead of pointing towards the creation of a coherent regulatory framework, theoretical proposals for transnational regulation range from ideas concerned with world courts ("global jurisdiction" 149 ), and "torture as tort" as well as "transnational civil human rights litigation", 150 to "scandalisation" (global shaming 151 ) and soft-law instruments, self-binding norms, codes of conduct and best practices. 152 These efforts illustrate the frustration with the lack of accountability, access to justice and democratic legitimacy of the evolving regulatory frameworks, 153 a frustration which has become increasingly accentuated in the context of a seemingly irreversible shift "from government to governance". 154 As transnational governance regimes, fields such as corporate governance, labour law, 155 capital market law, and consumer protection law 156 are increasingly marked by the 148 existence of opt-out clauses and self-regulation mechanisms, rather than being defined by enforceable hard-law rules. Meanwhile, it seems evident that a simple return to calls for "more" state interventionism is not a viable option in the light of the transnational nature of regulation today. Such a return is elusive, as the state can no longer be depicted as the last safe haven, which étatistes -such as Carl Schmitt and his pupils in administrative law 157 -had often made it out to be. As Saskia Sassen has recently re-iterated, both dryly and irrefutingly, there is an intimate connection between both the search for and the critique of law and the nation state. 158 Her observation is particularly astute as Sassen has, over the years, 159 greatly contributed to our better understanding of how allegedly "external" and overwhelming processes of "globalisation" should, instead, be seen as distinctly co-evolving with and as being produced, constructed and conceived of within the nation state. Rather than positing globalisation as a process, event or development that imprisons nation states, national economies and domestic political processes, Sassen prompts us to take a closer look at how the local is the dominant place of decision- making. Yet, she does not suggest a simple return to statism: instead, she suggests that there is a dynamic relation between locally identifiable processes of institutional and normative formation and the emergence of spatial regulatory regimes. It is through this relation that elements of physical and intellectual texture emerge to produce border-crossing "global assemblages". These constitute distinct spheres that, famously fuelled by the dramatic development of information technology, integrate territorial and de-territorial, vertical and horizontal ordering patterns to produce a structured regime of societal activities. 160 Meanwhile, continental public lawyers remain tempted to depict transnationalisation processes primarily as challenges to the re-assertion of "public authority" 161 in a world of disaggregated state power. 162 Similarly, European private lawyers continue coyly to attempt an escape from the reach of the juridification/intervention thrust by demarcating "traditionalists" from "transnationalists" -in the hope of positing the latter as the heroes of an autonomous legal order, distinct from the nation state. 163 Such intellectual efforts occur side-by-side with the continuing discussions and the untiring production of legislative proposals around a European private law. 164 Both projects provide telling illustrations of how transnational economic and commercial activities continue to challenge a state-based model of interventionist law to adapt 160 itself to a sphere structured by private self-regulation and political regulatory competition. 165 What is remarkable is the lack of real dialogue between "public" and "private" lawyers in this regard. While the conceptual and political problems arising around the emerging and proliferating regulatory regimes in the transnational sphere are obvious, public and private lawyers appear to pursue distinct and isolated paths, the former being interested in further scrutiny of "sovereignty" and "authority", 166 while the latter re-direct their interests towards the longstanding questions of regulatory competition. 167 There is a real opportunity here for public and private lawyers to join forces in order to unpack the intricate combination of state/non-state and public/private dimensions inherent to the emerging transnational regulatory landscape. 168 The opportunity arises out of the rich theoretical and doctrinal memories of public and private law with regard to the thematisation of exclusion and inclusion, participation and representation. 169 But, the danger is that the current efforts to study the particular dynamics of fast-evolving transnational regulatory regimes will be performed with little interest in the national pasts of legal regimes.
Against this background, Sassen's idea of global assemblages allows us to structure the sphere between the national and the international-transnational-global that has been plaguing legal imagination for some time now. simultaneously. This emphasis on national, local decisions and institutions that give rise to globalisation processes has gone a long way in allowing us to identify the concrete places at which policies, which later become identified as phenomena of globalisation, are prepared, taken and implemented. 171 This new understanding of the national basis of globalisation proceeds in relation to the well-known institutions, reference points and established procedures, such as states, parliaments, administrative agencies and, importantly, courts. These have long structured the economic, political and legal order, and are now struggling to re-ascertain their previously held roles and positions of power -but in a transnational context. 172 This relativisation of the local results in the discovery of a newly-emerging spatial category: the focus on space promises to capture more adequately the exhaustion of concretely-localised places of legal and political regulation from the perspective of the rise in importance of hybrid institutional structures and normative orders. This constellation presents tremendous challenges to both an analytical and prescriptive framework that was developed with reference to a more or less well-defined regulatory framework. The central challenge of this move from place to space lies in developing an appropriate language with which to address the institutional and normative challenges in a world that cannot effectively be governed through domestic-and domestically-minded rules. In the emerging spaces of global societal activity, the specifically legal perspective, which informs our present inquiry, is challenged by a multitude of contrasting investigations into the form, nature and quality of the global order. 173 Beyond the obvious need of irony on the part of the 171 Her work on global cities is of particular relevance in this regard: here, Sassen has been arguing for decades that global cities gain autonomy from their local environments both by adapting real-time collaborative and networking capacities with other cities and operative centres and by successfully demanding and implementing a facilitating, supportive infrastructure (electricity, broadband, digitisation, 24/7 service, access and maintenance). For a concise restatement of her long-term, monographical work on global cities, see S. Sassen, 'The Global City', in S. Fainstein and S. Campbell (eds) , Readings in Urban Theory (Blackwell, 1999), 61-71. lawyer in his or her quest to make sense of law in a globalising world in order to accept the relativity of the legal perspective lies, of course, the need to understand the continuing proliferation of pluralist normative orders.
VI. OUTLOOK
The continuing studies of transnational governance promise important insights into the complex relations between the emergence of hybrid institutions and the ambivalent, hard/soft norms produced in this context. There can be no doubt that these analytical efforts will continue to be carried out through various collaborations and exchanges between legal scholars, sociologists, political scientists, anthropologists and geographers, to name just a few of the participating disciplines. The emergence of transnational regulatory theory, however, is not necessarily a straightforward or smooth process. It is within each discipline that one has to identify points of departure towards a new perspective or theoretical construct. The advent of "governance" as an overarching term to capture the shift from state-based, nationally-defined regulation to transnational processes of norm creation and institutionalisation contributes to a further "interdisciplinarisation" of research, but it remains crucial to continue to unpack the meaning of this shift to governance within the different disciplines themselves. This paper has offered a number of observations regarding the adaptation of legal scholarship and doctrine to the process of transnationalisation, and, at every corner, we were able to see that, while we may no longer just be merely "shooting in the dark", it would clearly be too early to say that "we see the light".
